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FINAL FSPORT 
a. Scope 
The ~afety/R&QA Panel 9 t o  the  MSC Apollo 13 Invest igat ion Tean 
was establ ished t o  provide the  f ~ l l o w i n g  functions:  
1. Act i n  an advisory capacity t o  the  Tean Manager 
2. Provide spec i f i c  documentation and documentation cont ro l  
3. Provide technica l  support t o  Panels 1, 5 ,  6, 7, 8, 11 and 
members of the Inves t ige t ion  Board 
This repor t  summarizes these a c t i v i t i e s  and presents safsty/~&~& ( ~ n e l  9)  
recommendations. 
The ~afety/R&QA support through Panel 9 and through Rrnels 1, 5 ,  
6, 7, 8, and 11 is shown on the  preceding psge. Names of key people 
supporting these panels a r e  l i s t e d .  These people were sup-ported by 
personnel from NASA ~ a f e t y / ~ & Q A  elements, f'rom t h e i r  Boein:; Company and 
General E lec t r i c  Company support contractors ,  and by appr: m i a t e  hardware 
contractor  personnel. 
The safety/~&QA surmnary panel repor ts  ::eferenced i n  Section VI provide 
add i t iona l  d e t a i l s  of the  support supplied. It is estimated t h a t  a t  the  
peak of t h e  a c t i v i t y ,  the ~ a f e t y / ~ 8 & A  Offices had more tam 200 personnel 
d i r e c t l y  supporting t h e  investigation. 
I n  addi t ion  t o  the  technica l  support referenced abcve, ap-iroximately two 
thousand documents were re t r ieved ,  reproduced o r  otherwisl. made avai lab le  
t o  the  panels and t o  members of t h e  Invest igat ion -3rd. Most of t h e  
documents a r e  l i s t e d  in  the individual  panel summary reports  referenced i n  
Section V I  of t h i s  repor t .  Others supplied t o  members of the  Invest igat ion 
Board a r e  l i s t e d  i n  Enclosure A. S t i l l  others  supplied t o  team panels and 
not otherwise referenced a r e  l i s t e d  i n  Enclosure B of t h i s  report .  
c. Activities Prior t o  Fbrmation of the Apollo 13 Investigation Team 
During the Apollc 13 mission, the planned Safety/R&QA support 
was set up t o  review flight anomalies as  they occurred and t o  provide 
related data, information, and recommendations through the Safety/F&QA 
representatives on the Mission Monitoring Team. A t  the time of the cryol. 
genic tank incident, the Safety/~&QA organization Avnished supporting 
data and information related t o  the incident and reviewed changes i n  f l ight  
plan and f l ight  procedures as  they related t o  hardware capabilities t o  
It  assure safe recovery". Data, informat ion, and recommendat ions From these 
act ivi t ies  were furnished in real-time t o  the Mission Monitoring Warn. 
Immediately af ter  splashdown an effort  was init iated t o  collect data on 
certification and problem history and KSC checkout act ivi t ies  on problem 
related hardware. In addition, timelines and other basic informstioc were 
studied i n  preparation for the fomal  team activities. ~afety/RkQA support 
continued as  the Apollo 13 Investigation Team was being organized. The 
remainder of t h i s  report describes the support furnished t o  the Investigation 
Team. 
Panel 9 supported the investigation in the following areas: 
Served as overall ~afety/F&QA advisor t o  the team 
. Bovided support t o  board members 
. Provided support t o  Fanels 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11 as follaws: 
PAhlEL 1, Spacecraft Incident Investigation 
Compared previous safety related f1ig.h and t e s t  anomalies 
with Apollo 13 flight data 
Reviewed previous safety assessments of Apollo 7 through 13 
Evaluated t e s t  results and t e s t  analyses 
Provided Data Centers t o  enable : 
Control of pertinent historical documerrts, records, and data 
Security of data 
-pared history and reevaluated certification t e s t  data 
for cryogenic 02 tank 
Prepared synopsis of t e s t  procedures used a t  Beech Aircraft 
Corporation on the cryogenic O2 tank number 2 and a l l  
associated equipment 
Provided fa i lure  history of e lec t r ica l  connectors used on 
the cryogenic 02 tank 
PANEL 5 ,  Corrective Act ion Study and b l e m e n t a t  ion 
Analyzed safety impact of recommendat ions 
Evaluated alternatives re la t ive t o  previous safety assessments 
Evaluated t e s t  requirements and resul ts  
Assisted i n  establishing qualification requirements for possible 
cryoge~ic  02 tank redesign 
Evaluated & ternat  ive des f gns 
PANEL 6 .  Related Slvstems Evaluation 
- - 
. Analyzed proposed revisions for r e l i a b i l i t y  and safety considerations 
Evaluated alternatives relat ive t o  previous safety assessments 
Assessed nonmetallic material compatibility of a l l  oxygen, 
fbel, and oxidizer tank assemblies and l ine  components with the ' '. 
exception of cryogenic oxygen tanks t 
Provided informat ion on contaminat ion requirements 
Reviewed and assessed cer t i f icat ion and fai lure  history, fa i lure  t 
mode and effects  analysis and single point fa i lure  summaries 
and limited l i f e  requirements 
7 
3 
Provided F&QA inputs t o  Systems m i n e e r i n g  team members t $ 
Provided inputs on emergency backup modes i 
3 
. Provided information on pressure vessel explosion protection t 
Provided information on pyro in i t i a to r  debris 
Provided circui t  breaker data 
Reviewed and provided inputs into f ina l  report 
Determined energy levels of the effect of faulted e lec t r ica l  com- 
ponents oxygen and oxidizer interfaces with the exception of the 
cryogenic 02 tank 
4 
- 
f 
f 
PANEL 7 .  Reaction Rocesses in  Hiah Pressure Fluid Systems 
. Furnished documentation re la t ive t o  LOX compatibility of 
materials 
Listed and reevaluated two waivers against Apollo 13 on 02 
f luid cleanliness 
PANEL 8, ~ i g h  Pressure ~ x y g  
- 
en Systems Survey 
Gathered and reviewed information on f i r e s  and/or explosions 
in  02 enriched environments of greater than ambient pressures 
Assembled applicable design standards a ~ d  safety c r i t e r i a  
Furnished procedures used a t  MSC for cleaning of f ac i l i ty  % 
equipment 
PANEL 11, Administrat ion, Communications, and Procurement 
No significant ac t iv i ty  
1. The existing system for  control of the  hardware cer t i f icat ion 
t e a t  programs and assessment of completion is adequate. 
2. Formal closeout and recurrence control of reported hardware 
problems is adeqP.ate. 
3. The current MSC method for &&A and Engineering review of hardware 
nonconfo~mnces and mnterial review board actions is adequate. 
4. Gdequate background information on both specific and related 
generic hardware is contained in  the record system. 
5. There is  a comprehensive spacecraft cabin materials control 
program. The area of materials compatibility i n  high pressure f luids  
i s not completely understood. 
I V ,  IiECOMMENDATIONs 
1. It i s  recommended tha t  the present management system involving 
decisions a t  a l l  levels  on f l i g h t  hardware be reviewed. The objective 
would be t o  optimize v i s i b i l i t y  t o  management concerning background on 
the  speci f ic  and re la ted  generic hardware during the  decision-making process. 
2. It i s  recommended tha t  a comprehensive t e s t i ng  program t o  es tabl ish  
materials compatibility with hish pressure oxygen and other f lu id  systerns 
a s  used i n  spacecraft systems be undertaken by MSC. 
v, SUMMARY 
The safety/~&Q.A Officzs concur with t5.2 findings and corrective act ion 
defined t o  date r e i a t i ve  t o  tile A ~ c ~ l l o  15 cryogenic tank fa i lure ,  although 
cer t i f i ca t ion  and acceptance t e s t  requirements of the  new tanks have not 
yet been completely defined. 
Disposition of the  recommendat ions submitted by safety/=@ representatives 
through t h e i r  assigned panels has been sat isfactory.  
M. L. Raines 
Chairman, Panel 9 
mC Apollo 13 investigation Team 
VI .  REFERENCES 
The following is  a l i s t  of Summary Reports submitted by saiety/~&QA 
sapport t o  the Apollo 13 Investigation Team Rulels : 
Reference 1: Final  Report, Panel 1, Group b, His tor ica l  Records 
Handling and Cataloging, ND/ML~ 18, lg0. 
Reference 2: Panel 5a, CSM, Corrective Action Study and Implementa- 
t ion Panel, Safety and R&QA Report t o  PBnel 9, S N , ' M ~ ~  15, 1970. 
Reference 3 : Panel 5b, Lunar Module, Corrective Action Study and 
Implementation Panel, R&QA and Safety Report t o  Panel 9, N A / P . ~ ~ ~  18, 1970. 
Reference 4: Panel 5c, Government-Furnished Equipment, Corrective 
Action Study and Implementation Panel, Safety and R&QA Report t o  Panel 9, 
S N / ~ I ~ ~  15, 1970. 
Reference 5: Input t o  Panel 9,  Safety and R&QA Summary of R&QA Par- 
t ic ipat ion t o  Panel 6, Related Systems Evaluation, ~ ~ / 7 0 - ~ 5 2 5 ,  m y  14, 
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Reference 6: Panel 7, Reaction Processes in F l i a t  Pressure Fluid 
System, N D / M B ~  18, 1970. 
Reference 7: Pressure Oxygen Systems Panel, Safety 
and R&QA Report t o  14, 1970. 
Panel 9 - Safety and R&Q,A Documents Transmittei t o  the  
Apollo 13 Investigation Board (Messrs. Whitten and w inter) 
Documents l i s t e d  b e l m  were transmitted to :  
a. Mr. D. Ginter 
Problem Control System Briefing Charts 
CSM Open Problem L i s t  - dated April 23, 1970 
CSM-108 Launch Readi~ess  Report, issues 8 and 11 
24-HOW Notification Report 
Anomaly L l  st - Apollo 12 
Apollo 13 RFlF (Friday night report) 
R&QA 02 Tank Cert if icat ion Report 
FLznctions and Organization Safety Office - MSCI 1138.1~ and 
Applicable Posit ion Descriptions 
Parer and Propulsion Division (&el  ~ e l l s / C r y o ~ e n i c s )  Applicable 
Position Descriptions 
M3C Safety Plan - M3CM 1701 (currently being revised) 
Boeirg Apollo TIE System Safety Plan - D2-118036-1~ 
Organization Boeing System Safety 
Boeing System Safety Technical Management Review (typical)  
hnc t ions  and Organization ASP0 - MSCI 1141.1 
Assistant Program knage r  Flight Safety, ASK), MSM 67-126 and 
Applicable Position Descriptions 
Requirements fo r  Apollo Contractor Safety Plan (2-17-69) 
KSGMSC Relationships a t  the  Cape 
Apollo 13 Safety Support - Safety Office and Boeing System Safety 
Boeing - Selected Areas of Concern for  Apollo 6 (&el  Cells and 
Cryogenics) E- 118072- 1 
Boeing - Apollo Spacecraft System Safety Assessments - Apollo 11 
and 13 - 2 volumes each 
Boeing - Apollo Spacecraft System Safety Assessment - Apollo 7 
t o  13 Ekcerpts pertaining t o  CSM Cryogenic Oxygen System 
Detanking Cryo Oxygen Problem a t  K;SC - DT-0512 
Nonmetallic Materials i n  the  m g e n  Storage Tank Assembly 
Configuration Control Board Minutes regarding CSM Cryogenics 
MSC F&QA/safety Suspect Flight Anomaly Report - Apollo 13 
Historical  Summary of the  Apollo 13 Cryo Owgen Tank No. 2 
( S/N 1 0 0 2 4 ~ ~ 0 0 0 8 )  
WC Safety Office Act iv i t ies  pr ior  t o  and during the  Apollo 13 
Incident through Splashdown, b y  22, 1970 
Apollo 13 Be-Launch R&QA Activi t ies  
&&A ( GE) Data Bank - Flight Anomalies 
Development Certification Test History of &yo Tank No. 2 
Apollo FMEA (Cryo system); Single Point mi lure  Summary 
Skylab FMEA ( Cryo system) 
Apollo 204 Accident - &yo Oxygen regarding Action Items (NASA) 
Apollo 204 Accident - Cryo Oxygen regarding Design Changes 
North American Rockwell Contract W9-150, System Safety Monthly 
Report, Period ending February 28, 1970 
System Safety Audit Report on North American Rockwell, Space 
Division, Dcnsney, California, dated October 1, 19% 
North American Rockwell, Space Division, Safety Organization 
l%ult Tree Analysis, Apollo 13 Incident, dated May 12, 1970 
Letter t o  NASA Hqs., tkom M. L. Raines, dated April 29, 1 9 0 ,  
Subject, R. Emerson Harris (Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
~ e p o r t )  "System Safety Review and Evaluation of the M3C and 
Its Principle Apollo Prime Contractors, period - October 7-16, 
1968" 
Manpower Summary F&QA/safety as of April 30, 1970 
Mission Log Book - Apollo 13 
Apollo Mission-Safety Concerns Status ( ~ o e i n ~ )  March 11,1970 
WR Flight Safety Assessment, Apollo 13 Mission, dated February 26, 
1970 
Apollo 13 Spacecraft Readiness Status, dated March 6, 1970 
MSC Comments dated July 7, 1969, on Combined Aviation, Systems, 
and- Industrial Safety Survey, MSC, April 14-17, 1969 R&w Assessment Statement Apollo 13 night Readiness Review 
R&QA Weekly Activity Reports t o  AA/R. R. Gilruth fo r  periods for 
January 1, 1970 t o  May 16, 1970 inclusive 
REQA Weekly Activity Reports t o  P A / c ~ ~ .  McDivitt for periods 
Jfinuary 1, N O  t o  MBy 16, 1970 inclusive 
II&QA b n t h l y  Assessment Reports for October and November 1969 
Phase I1 LM-7 CARR - Trip Report, April 16-17, 1969 
CSM-109 FIIR a t  KSC - Trip Report, Jan- 16-17, 1970 
Mode IV Abort Report (Being),  November 1969 
CSM-109 Phase 111 CAHR, Downry, June 3-4, 1969, Trip Report 
Apollo 13 R&Q4 Flight Readiness Assessment 
Documents Distributed t o  Board Members May 21, 1970 
Apollo Spacecraft Nonme+,allic l&terials Requirements, mC!- PA- 
~ 6 7 - 1 3 ,  Ekbzwary 9, 1968, (~ddendum No. 1, November 7, 1969) 
Procedures and Requirements for the Flammability and Offgassing 
Evaluation of Manned Spacecraft Nonmetallic Materials, 
DM-0002, July 1968 
Nonmetallic Materials Design Guidelines and. Test Dsta Handbook, 
M G N A - D - ~ ~ - ~ ,  Revision F, November 26, 1969 
ENCLOSURE B 
- 
The following repor ts  were supplied t o  Apollo 13 Invest igat ion Tearn 
members : 
1. "Ppollo 1.3 Invest! gation, Panel 6 - Relat?d Systems Evaluation 
Inputs from Re l i&hi l i ty  and Qual!.ty, Revision 1," ~~/70-1~-,+0, dated 
~QY 15,  19-70. 
2 "A Li te ra ture  Survey uf Rev-3s of Unexpected Incidents i n  the 
Presence of Oxygen a t  Concentrations and Pressures Iiigher tnan t h a t  of 
the Norm1 Atmosphere ," dated May 1 4 ,  1970, provided t o  Panel 8. 
3. "Spececraft 103 - Shelf Incident Report , I t  dated May 12, 1970, 
(copy attached).  
Item 3, Enciosure B 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS qD SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
I MSC APOLLO 13 I N V E S T I G A T I O N   TEAM^ 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
Housrou. TEXAS 77058 
MEMORANDUM TO : Leader, Apollo 13 Investigai;ion Tear1 
FROM : Pane 1 9 Chairman 
SUEMET : Spicecraft 109 - Shelf incident report  
The pupose of this report  is t o  provide a c h r o n o l c ~ i c a l h i s t o r y  of 
events leading t o  a& including t h i s  incident n t  the contractor's plant, 
Downey , California. 
On August 22, 1x8, North American Rockwell (W) Engineering Older (EO) 
~702138, was released, which reqclred a change t o  vac-ion pumps t o  prevent 
corona discharge. The shelf  on CSM 106 was selected t o  be removed and 
updated f o r  CSM 109. This w a s  a normal in l ine  \Ipdate. EO 702134-1 and 2 
authorized the rework and test of the 02 tank assembly and vac-ioll p . p s  
by Beech Aircraf t  Corporation. 
A manufacturing order ( f a i r  t i cke t )  number 488757, was writ ten August 24, 
1968, against EO ~702138 t o  provide f o r  removal and rework of the 
shelf ~37-4~+200-41 S/C 106. 
On October 21, 1968, approximately 10:W i n  the morning, servize mdule 
106 was ret~,ned t o  t e s t  stand, posit ion 2A, Bldg 230, NEI Downey. The 
SM ;as rotated 900 from its no~mal ins ta l l a t ion  position t o  accommodate 
the overhead crtme, the gER-ln5 (counter balance) and the gM-1009 
($ shelf removzl f ix ture) .  
I n  t h i s  positio-rl, sector #4 of the SM would be facing the front  of the 
stand. The f loors  of the stand are designed t o  fold back and the removal 
equipnent can be eas i ly  attached. 
A t  approximately 3:30 p.m. on October 21, 1968, an attempt was made t o  
remove the 02 shelf  from SM 106. The 9EH-1009 shzlf  adapter model was 
attached t o  the $ shelf and pe 9EH--1275 counter weight s l ing  was attached 
t o  the overhead crane. The 0 shelf was l i f t e d  approximately two inches, 
the  counter balance was being ad dusted,  and the overhead crane was being 
mo.ed outward when the gM-1009 shelf  adapter broke a t  the lower attachment 
weld. Znmediately following the weld break ~ r ,  the SH-1009 shelf adapter, 
the 02 shelf  dropped back to  its mating surface in the S1V structure.  The 
9M-1275 counter-weight s l ing  swurig up t t i n g  the test stand s tmc tu re  
and damaging e l i g h t  f ixture .  The area was immediately roped off and in- 
dus t r i a l  security was notified,  There were no personal injuries.  
Disposition record (DR) ~80327, item #158, was in i t i a ted  a t  the scene 
and photographs were taken of the 02 shelf, the innnediate surrounding 
area and the broken 9EH-1009 adap>er. A f t e r  further investigation, it 
was discovered in preparing the shelf fo r  removal from the service 
module, one of the 11 shelf retaining bo l t s  was inadvertently l e f t  i n  
place. A s  par t  of the corrective act ion on the disposi t ion record #158, 
sequential irlspections were performed on the shelf and i n  the surrounding 
areas. Dye penetrant inspections were made i n  the areas of the #3 rad ia l  
beam s t i f f n e r  and the structure was found acceptable. During the inspection 
of the surrounding areas, a small identation (ding) was noted d i r ec t ly  
above oxygen tarlk number two i n  the face sheet of the fue l  c e l l  shelf.  
This indentation was wri t ten up on disposition report A112436 #159 and 
l a t e r  dispositioned as a normal standard repair.  
The 9EH-1009 f ix ture  w a s  repaired by adding s t i f fne r s  t o  e i t he r  side of 
the a6apter f ix ture  along with rewelding the tubing and the @ shelf was 
removed and taken to  the systems test laboratory f o r  the vac-ion modifi- 
cation and subsequent t es t ing  on October 22, 1%8. 
A manufacturing order (no number) was issued October 28, 1968, t o  
transport the 02 shelf Prcm Bldg 290 t o  Bidg 288 f o r  fu r ther  test ing.  
On November 12, 1968, CR 140539 w a s  wri t ten by the NASA Quali ty 
organization requesting NASA Systems Engineering evaluation f o r  r e t e s t  
provisions resul tant  Ran the  02 shelf drop incident. !The retest re- 
quirements w e r e  evaluated and the necessary tes t ing  w a s  accomplished during 
the time the 02 shelf was i n  the test cel l .  
The @ shelf w a s  returned t o  Bldg #290 on the 20th of November, 1968. 
Inspection f o r  ident i f ica t ion and damage w a s  performed and the 02 shelf 
was ins ta l led  i n  SM 109 on the 22nd of November, 1968. 
The corrective action +&ken by NR is as follows: 
1. 1nd.d~ trial Security Report (~04453) .
2. Corrective Action Recoxd (u.c.) #~80327. 
3. W. H. Gray l e t t e r  t o  D. D. Wrs, ~ ~ / 6 8 ~ 1 0 - 1 3 7 3 ,  dated October 23, 
1968, NR response -8067, dated November 4, 1968. 
4. HAMP Manual uplate t o  correct problem 10/29/70. 
5. Review and update of handling equipnent. 
6. Review and revise exist ing planning. 
Fnclosures 1 and 2 of t h i s  report  are  the  photographs and documents 
assembled t o  describe t h i s  event. 
Copies have been provided t o  Structures and Mechanics Division and the 
Investigation Board t o  determine the Impact of t h i s  drop and i ts  relation- 
ship, i f  any, with the Apollo 13 incident. 
Enclosures 12 
